The mobilisation of organised interests in policy making: access, activity and bias in the 'group system'. by Halpin, Darren & Baxter, Graeme
  
 
AUTHOR(S): 
 
 
TITLE:  
 
 
YEAR:  
 
Publisher citation: 
 
 
 
OpenAIR citation: 
 
 
 
Publisher copyright statement: 
 
 
 
 
 
OpenAIR takedown statement: 
 
 This publication is made 
freely available under 
__________ open access. 
 
 
 
 
 
This report was commissioned by _________________________________________________________________ 
and was published in the first instance by __________________________________________________________. 
(ISBN _____________________; eISBN ________________________; ISSN _______________) 
This publication is distributed under a CC ____________ license. 
____________________________________________________ 
 
Section 6 of the “Repository policy for OpenAIR @ RGU” (available from http://www.rgu.ac.uk/staff-and-current-
students/library/library-policies/repository-policies) provides guidance on the criteria under which RGU will 
consider withdrawing material from OpenAIR. If you believe that this item is subject to any of these criteria, or for 
any other reason should not be held on OpenAIR, then please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with the details of 
the item and the nature of your complaint. 
 
REFERENCE No.  
End of Award Report
The mobilisation of organised interests in policy making:  
Access, activity and bias in the “group system” 
RES-000-22-1932
Dr Darren Halpin 
Principal Investigator 
and
Mr Graeme Baxter 
Research Fellow 
Department of Public Policy 
The Robert Gordon University 
April, 2009 
 14
To cite this output:  
Halpin, Darren (2009). The mobilisation of organised interests in policy making: Access, activity and bias in the 'group system': 
Full Research Report, ESRC End of Award Report, RES-000-22-1932. Swindon: ESRC
REFERENCE No.  
 
Background  
 
What organized interests are mobilized in influencing public policy? What does the map 
of organised interests – the ‘group system’ – look like? This has been a central concern in 
political science for decades. The reason for this preoccupation is clear. As Schlozman 
(2009) succinctly notes ‘… since organized interests are so important in informing public 
officials about the preferences and needs of stakeholders in political controversies and 
about how policies affect their lives and fortunes, the shape of the organized interest 
community matters crucially for the equal protection of citizen interests’. This broad area 
of scholarly endeavour has settled into a set of more or less well established focal points.  
Following Schattschneider (1960), there has been a consistent finding of a ‘business bias’ 
in the ‘group system’ (see also Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Browne 1990, Walker 1991, 
Baumgartner and Leech 2001). Others have focussed upon the declining centrality of 
‘producer’ interests to policy making: suggesting that there is a ‘hollow core’ to policy 
communities (Heinz et al. 1993). It has been argued that the group system is characterised 
by the growth of niche or specialised policy actors (see Gray and Lowery 2000; Heaney 
2004). These propositions and questions have rarely been explored empirically in 
quantitative studies outside of the US, and certainly not for the UK or Scotland.  
 
The absence of studies of this nature in Britain could just reflect that groups and 
organised interests are simply a less important subject of study. The ascendancy of the 
‘Westminster model’ has corralled scholarly attention in the direction of parliamentary 
output. Yet it has been long asserted that the ‘consultative’ system involving organised 
interests and the bureaucracy, (i) is important alongside the parliamentary (McKenzie 
1958; Rose 1984), (ii) constitutes the British (and Scottish) ‘policy style’ (Richardson and 
Jordan 1979; Cairney 2008), and (iii) is the ‘orthodox’ UK public policy approach (Grant 
2001). Others have highlighted the importance of the civil service in the legislative 
process (Page 2003). Perhaps, then, part of the reason for the absence of such studies is 
that data collection is difficult (May et al 1998). Against this backdrop, the primary 
purpose of this research project was to deliver a dataset that would allow for a UK voice 
in this broad debate. The project has done just that by delivering a dataset that maps 
Scottish Government consultations. It spans more than two decades (1982-2007), 
covering almost 1700 discrete public consultations (issues) and includes more than 
18,000 different organized actors engaging in more than 180,000 separate ‘influence 
events’.  
 
This work is timely as several data collection projects have been completed that, in 
related but different ways, map the incidence of organised interests in public policy1. The 
research reported here contributes to work by comparative scholars of interest 
group/organized interests and public policy (particularly in the US): it will provide a 
                                                 
1 For instance, it connects with the expanding US ‘Policy Agendas’ project (managed by Baumgartner and 
Jones) and resonates with the long tradition of US studies of ‘bias’ in the US group system (work underway 
by Kay Schlozman and colleagues). Contacts have been made with both research projects. 
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related non-US literature. The work also has importance for other UK projects currently 
underway2.  
 
Objectives 
 
The first objective was to pilot a process of policy issue-level data collection that could 
(eventually) be rolled-out UK wide, and perhaps on a cross-national comparative basis. 
As discussed in the ‘Future Research Priorities’ section below, this pilot project 
demonstrated that a broader UK project was practical and would yield valuable outputs. 
 
The primary deliverable was to utilise records of Scottish Executive/Government 
consultations to generate a dataset of ‘actors to policy-issues’ for both the (1) pre- and (2) 
post-devolution time periods. A third (3) data collection objective was to leverage the list 
of interest groups generated by this mapping process as a population from which to 
randomly sample groups for the purposes of a postal survey3. The three data collection 
aims have been met in full: (1) a map of all participants active in Scottish public policy 
has been generated at an issue-level. This spans a 25-year period, includes 1691 policy-
related consultation processes, and includes almost 18,000 discrete actors; (2) this dataset 
incorporates data for pre- and post-devolution periods, and enables a comparison 
between the two; and (3) a survey of a population of 1459 interest groups engaged in 
post-devolution Scottish public policy has been completed (response rate 32%, n=469) 
which provides the first such data on Scottish interest groups. In addition, and beyond the 
project scope, we collected data on (a) consultations undertaken by MSPs as part of 
formulating Members’ Bills; (b) the consultations mentioned in the Policy Memoranda 
required for introduction of a Bill into the Scottish Parliament, and (c) (with Iain 
MacLeod) contributed to the development of a dataset mapping organised interests 
giving evidence to Scottish Parliamentary Committees (1999-2007).  
 
The second, and substantive, research objective was to utilise this mapping data to engage 
in key debates hitherto dominated by US scholars. The results below provide an 
overview of the way this data can be used to engage in scholarly debates. As discussed 
below (see Methods section), the process of collecting and compiling the data has 
occupied the overwhelming proportion of our time and resources, far beyond that which we 
anticipated. Consequently, data analysis is still at a preliminary stage. However, we are 
working our way through the data and generating project outputs as we go. We have 
involved overseas scholars in the analysis (Dr Anne Binderkrantz – Aarhus University, 
Denmark; Herschel Thomas III – University of Texas, US), which will serve to both 
disseminate results through the (non-UK) discipline, but also bring to the project new 
analytical and comparative perspectives. As discussed in the Outputs section below, we 
have generated several conference papers and this is ongoing. These will (over time) 
generate journal articles and a book proposal is currently with publishers.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Professor Grant Jordan has almost completed an ESRC project ‘Group Metrics: Scoping the Scale, Types 
and Trends of UK interest group numbers’ [RES 000 22 1959]. His results map UK associations and offer 
a complementary analysis of ‘bias’ in the group system. Links have been made with Professor Jordan. 
3 The dataset from such a survey would enable more general questions about the nature of groups 
themselves to be answered. 
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Methods 
 
As discussed above, there is a UK tradition of civil servants consulting with organised 
interests across all stages of the policy process (from agenda setting to implementation). 
Thus, consultation offers an important window into the extent and pattern of 
mobilisation by policy actors4. Consultations are undertaken by civil servants in 
government departments for various reasons – e.g. to gauge initial reactions to a broad 
agenda, to obtain comments on a draft Bill or on modifications to specific (and technical) 
government regulations. Our data incorporates examples of consultations in all these 
guises.  
 
The project’s primary deliverable was the generation of a dataset of all actors engaged in 
public policy consultations in Scotland between 1982 and 2007. This dataset was 
compiled largely using paper-based records held in the Scottish Government Library and 
its document storage facility in Edinburgh, but with the addition of some more recent 
documentation only available electronically on the Publications pages of the Scottish 
Government website. Some limitations are important to acknowledge. The Scottish 
Government’s internal Consultation Good Practice Guidance (2008) recommends that 
departments, on completing a consultation exercise, should deposit copies of responses 
with the Scottish Government Library and also post them on the Scottish Government 
website. However, this guidance has not always been followed, and therefore not all 
consultation documentation has made its way into the public domain. No definitive list of 
consultations conducted by the Scottish Government exists. Using the only points of 
reference available5 we estimate that our dataset contains the responses to around 60% 
of all Scottish Government (and Scottish Office) consultations conducted between 1982 
and 20076. But, this is simply an estimate. We can definitively say that we mapped each and 
every consultation where data is available in the public domain: it is as comprehensive as 
it can ever be.  
 
Methodologically, it is important to note that the research has adopted an innovative 
research design that has corrected many of the deficiencies in past attempts to map 
mobilisation by policy participants. The literature has recorded the difficulty in getting 
beyond generalised accounts of mobilisation. Typically, surveys of known groups deliver 
a general take on mobilisation; for instance Walker’s (1991) impressive study of 
Washington groups could tell us in which policy domains groups were ‘interested’: 
agriculture, health, etc. This could not say whether ‘interest’ led to actual mobilisation, 
nor could it deal with issue-level variation (e.g. in how many issues in the agricultural 
domain were they active?) or the intensity of group activity (e.g. how often were they 
active?). The Baumgartner and Leech study (2001) was the first to map actual issue level 
activity by policy actors; and, as such, could start to answer these questions. The data we 
                                                 
4 In other work we explore engagement by organized interests directly with the Scottish Parliament 
through its committee system. Initial analysis suggests similar results as presented in this report for 
government consultations.  
5  These are (i) The Scottish Government’s internal Consultation Registration & Evaluation System, (ii) the 
Consultations pages on the Scottish Government website, and (iii) a 1999-2005 list of consultations prepared 
in response to a journalist’s Freedom of Information request. 
6 Initially we had records for 2064 consultations. Of these, 1691 had responses recorded. We then 
compared this list to (i) the Consultations pages of the Scottish Government website, and (ii) a list published 
by the SE as a result of a Freedom of Information request by the Scotsman newspaper (July 2005). A lengthy 
comparison of our dataset with these lists shows that we have data for around 70% of each. This, in turn, 
suggests that overall we have responses to around 60% of all consultations which appear in one or other 
list. Details could not be found for the remaining consultations. 
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have generated is in a similar vein, and is the first such dataset for the UK. Thus, 
methodologically, it is significant (in UK and comparatively). 
  
The secondary dataset is the result of a postal survey of ‘interest groups’ active in post-
devolution Scottish public policy. Here, the sample was drawn from a list of those 
organisations who had responded to consultations in the period 1999-2007. A weighted 
sampling method was used, whereby the more active organisations in the sampling frame 
were more likely to be included in the sample.  This approach to sampling addresses 
recent calls from group scholars to integrate the analysis of group organisations with 
policy activity (Beyers et al. 2008). Because our sample comes from a broader analysis of 
actual group activity over a 25-year period, we can explore the ways in which group 
organisational variables (measured in the survey) may explain policy activity (measured in 
the broader consultations dataset). This is the subject of a paper (with Anne 
Binderkrantz) to be delivered at a seminar at Aarhus University (May 2009) and at the 
ECPR General Conference (September 2009).  
 
Results 
 
In what follows, we provide an overview of the type of key debates that this data can be 
used to engage in, and gesture to the preliminary findings. Of course, as was the stated 
intention of the project - analysis may be taken in a range of other directions. This will 
happen over time.  
 
(A)  Mapping the ‘group system’ 
The core literature this research set out to engage with is the (largely US) tradition of 
mapping the ‘group system’ or the system of ‘organised interests’. So what is the shape of 
the ‘group system’? The expectations of generations of group scholars have been shaped 
by Schattschneider’s (1960) remark that the ‘heavenly chorus’ of organized interests 
speaks with an upper class accent. The consistent finding has been the level of ‘business’ 
dominance. For reasons outlined above, this has been a debate constrained to US studies 
of Washington lobbying – albeit that UK scholars are encumbered with the general 
finding which shapes expectations (see Jordan 2009). But what evidence is there that this 
finding holds for a non-US context like the UK?  
 
Below, Table 1 reports the types of actors engaged in consultations using our data 
(pooled 1982-2007). It reports both overall activity (allowing multiple counts of each 
actor), and the number of discrete actors (single counts). We have coded our data in a 
variety of (more or less detailed) ways: but to aid comparability here we utilise the coding 
scheme adopted by Baumgartner and Leech (2001). It shows that ‘Government’ and 
‘Institutions’ (composed of operational arms of government – in the education and 
health fields) constitute the majority of overall activity.  
 
It should be noted that Tables 1, 2 and 3 omit data on individual citizens7. This is 
because to make coding manageable we coded each citizen as the same actor: so 
individuals count for only a single actor. In our data, we record activity by over 90,000 
individual citizens: with the majority of this activity concentrated on a single issue 
(smoking in public places) and the balance distributed over a small clutch of issues. 
                                                 
7 Tables do, however, include data on anonymous responses, i.e. responses with no respondent’s name 
attached and therefore unidentifiable as being from either an individual or an organization. These were 
coded as a single organization for actor counts, but included in the overall figures for activity. 
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Table 1. Composition and Activity of Mobilized Policy Actors*  
Type of Actor  Activity  Actors Act. Ratio
  N % N %  
Governments 32016 34.5 2590 14.0 12.4 
Institutions 19575 21.1 5367 29.1 3.6 
Non-Profits and Citizen Groups 14904 16.0 3850 20.9 3.9 
Professional Associations 7721 8.3 1026 5.6 7.5 
Businesses 7032 7.6 3748 20.3 1.9 
Trade Associations 5819 6.3 1116 6.0 5.2 
Other 4974# 5.4 686 3.7 7.3 
Unions 845 0.9 73 0.4 11.6 
Total 92886 100.0 18456 100.0 5.0 
*Excluding individual citizens who were all coded as a single actor. # This figure includes anonymous 
responses (which could be organizations or individuals).  
 
 
Table 2 compares our data (pooled 1982-2007) with data from Baumgartner and Leech 
(2001) based on congressional lobbying registrations (for 1996) and with Schlozman’s 
(2009) analysis of the Washington Representatives directory (for 2006).  
 
 
Table 2. Population of Organized Interests Mobilized: Comparison with US Lobby data* 
 
Scottish Data  
(1982-2007) 
US Data 
(1996) 
Washington 
Representatives 
(2006) 
 N % N % % 
Institutions+ 5367 29.1 450 8 9.8
Non-Profits and Citizen Groups 3850 20.9 552 9 8.8
Businesses 3748 20.3 2548 43 36.1
Governments^ 2590 14.0 706 12 11.8
Trade Associations~ 1116 6.0 948 16 10.7
Professional Associations 1026 5.6 336 6 5.2
Unions 73 0.4 60 1 0.8
Other# 686 3.7 317 5 16.8
Total 18456 100.0 5907 100 100.0
Source: US data is reported in Baumgartner and Leech (2001, Table 2 ‘Total Registrations’); Washington Rep’s data is 
reported in Schlozman (2009, Table 1): this data was converted into different categories for comparison purposes. 
*Excluding individual citizens who were all coded as a single actor. + To make this comparable to US data, this 
category includes the operational elements of government, such as schools, hospitals etc.^ This includes central 
government departments, local authorities, parliament and NDPBs. ~ We adopt the US label, but this includes all 
collective business organisations. #This includes anonymous responses (which could be organizations or individuals) 
 
The most obvious finding from Table 2 is the dominance of ‘institutions’ in our data 
compared to ‘business’ in the US data. There are some clear methodological and contextual 
reasons for this. Many operational elements of government8 – which are coded as 
‘institutions’ – are omitted from the directories counted by both US studies but prevalent 
                                                 
8 For example, a high number of ‘educational’ related institutions - schools, school boards and related 
bodies - are in our data under the institutions heading.  
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in our data. But this alone cannot explain the finding. One contextual factor is the 
different role of the state in service delivery in the UK (versus US). Moreover, the fact 
that the operational functions of many of what are (governmental) institutions in the UK 
are performed by private sector businesses in the US, is probably also evident in the data. 
The broader conclusion from these two tables is that while interest group scholars say 
they are mapping the ‘group system’, in fact – if they pursue the idea of mapping more or 
less all policy active organisations – they end up mapping a small sector of collective 
interest groups surrounded by a broader population of ‘institutional’ policy participants 
(only around 33% of actors in our data are ‘groups’). This recalls Salisbury’s longstanding 
assertion that groups are important actors in public policy, but that institutions – he 
includes businesses, government and public sector organisations – are perhaps the most 
numerous and significant (1984).  
 
The underlying processes that ‘deliver’ the observable ‘group system’ have also been 
hotly contested. Early pluralists assumed more or less automatic formation of groups to 
represent interests (Bentley 1908, Truman 1951). Others suggested that ‘collective action’ 
problems mean many interests would go unorganised: interests may exist but 
organisations may not form (Olson 1965). More recently Gray and Lowery (2000) argued 
that formation issues needed to be considered against the issue of ‘mortality’: the group 
system could not grow infinitely as there are limits in terms of the carrying capacity of 
any political system. However, Schlozman (2009) argues that none of these approaches 
really capture the transitory nature of policy active organizations: the complexion of the 
group system owes just as much to the ways in which actors – often policy non-dedicated – 
engage in policy life and then withdraw, going into political ‘hibernation’.  
 
The data generated from our study provides a unique window into the fluid process of 
entering and then emerging out of political ‘hibernation’ identified by Schlozman. We 
cannot assess organisational births and deaths: this is made easy by directories that note the 
entry and exit of groups from the ‘system’9. But, that an actor is absent from the policy 
scene for a lengthy period – which our data catalogues – does suggest that it is in policy 
‘hibernation’10. Our approach is more sensitive than directories to this nuanced pattern 
of engagement (and disengagement) from the policy process. If we look at the number of 
times individual actors in our dataset engaged in consultations over a 25-year period, we 
find that 57% responded just a single time: they are like the Clydebank Youth Forum or 
the Annbank Primary School Board who engage in policy only as it comes to them – they 
are not policy dedicated actors. Only 6% of actors engaged more than 10 times over the 
25-year period. Most are ‘sporadic interventionists’ in politics (Dowse and Hughes 1977). 
 
The ‘bias’ argument is far more problematic to assess. There is a readiness in the US 
literature to read numerical head-counts of actors as a proxy for power (although see 
Lowery and Gray 2004). This infers a rather crude version of pluralism which, in a UK 
context, seems to ignore a range of alternative interpretations of numbers. For instance, 
the neo-corporatist tradition would read numerical superiority as weakness – unity is 
deemed crucial for ‘bargaining’ with government. A more suitable way to ‘test’ for the 
diversity of the system would be to look at the presence/absence of sets of interests on 
particular issues. The import of Schlozman’s (2009) finding with respect to the 
intermittent hibernation of organised interests suggests that the production of ‘bias’ is 
                                                 
9 For instance the Washington Representatives directory notes ‘registrations’ and ‘terminations’ in real time 
on its web-site. 
10 Of course, it may be active in policy life in other guises, they may engage the media, lobby directly or any 
other strategy: this is unlikely, given the open access to consultations, but possible. 
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likely to be in the process of mobilisation (or lack of mobilisation) by specific sets of 
interests across the spectrum of policy issues within a policy system. Indeed, this is 
precisely what Baumgartner and Leech (2001) record when they note that business seems 
to be left to ‘lobby alone’ on issues with few participants. In general terms, our data 
shows a similar preponderance of business in those consultations with little mobilisation 
(see Halpin and Baxter 2008). Given our unease at reading off influence from basic ‘head 
counts’ of actors, making sense of this finding requires further case study analysis of 
mobilisation over specific issues. 
 
(B) Patterns of policy mobilisation? 
One of the innovative elements of this research was the choice to map actors at the issue 
level. Mapping the mobilisation of actors to specific consultations makes a link between 
mobilisation and a particular policy-issue context. This enables analysis of the variation in 
mobilisation across policy contexts. The only other study that we are aware of that has 
attempted a similar method is the work of Baumgartner and Leech (2001) who set about 
mapping ‘how the involvement of groups is distributed across issues’. Their core finding 
was that most issues gathered small levels of mobilisation, while a handful of issues 
accounted for a disproportionately large degree of activity: there were a few ‘bandwagon 
issues’ accompanied by a large number of ‘quiet corners’. We are able to test this finding 
for the UK context.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of actors across issues, 1982-2007 (pooled). 
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Figure 1 graphs the number of responses11 (level of mobilisation) across all our issues for 
the 25-year period. It reveals the same skewed pattern found by Baumgartner and Leech 
(2001) in their US data. But they only had one year’s worth of data, and we have 25 years. 
Further analysis establishes that this skewed pattern is repeated for any particular period 
of time. As Figure 2 below shows, it is repeated when data is organised roughly into UK 
parliamentary periods (it also holds for a single year, like that of 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This particular figure is calculated by counting single actors once per consultation. We also remove 
individuals from the data. However, the shape of the distribution looks similarly skewed regardless of 
whether we include (i) multiple responses by the same actor to a given consultation (activity) or (ii) include 
individual citizen responses.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of actors across issues, by UK parliamentary terms. 
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The degree of skewness is demonstrated numerically in Table 3. It records the 
cumulative percent that each 169 consultation issues (10% of all 1691 issues) add to 
overall mobilisation (measured as activity or actors). It shows that the 30% of issues with 
the lowest mobilisation levels account for under 5% of all activity. By contrast, the 10% 
of issues with the highest mobilisation levels account for over 30% of all activity.  
 
Table 3. The Proportion of Mobilization by Issue       
 Actors Activity 
Percent of Issues Number Percent Cum. Number Percent Cum. 
Lowest 10 percent (169 issues) 469 0.57 0.57 492 0.53 0.53 
10.1 to 20 (issues 169 to 338) 1,318 1.63 2.21 1,401 1.51 2.04 
20.1 to 30 (to issue 507) 2,223 2.73 4.94 2,357 2.54 4.58 
30.1 to 40 (to issue 676) 3,408 4.19 9.12 3,670 3.95 8.53 
40.1 to 50 (to issue 852) 4,930 5.85 15.18 5,091 5.48 14.01 
50.1 to 60 (to issue 1021) 6,207 7.62 22.8 6,612 7.12 21.13 
60.1 to 70 (to issue 1190) 7,854 9.65 32.45 8,420 9.06 30.19 
70.1 to 80 (to issue 1359) 9,982 12.26 44.71 10,818 11.65 41.84 
80.1 to 90 (to issue 1528) 13,279 16.31 61.02 14,482 15.59 57.43 
90.1 to 95 (to issue 1613) 9,629 11.83 72.84 10,704 11.52 68.94 
95 to 99.9 (to issue1690) 20,923 25.7 98.54 27,412 29.51 98.46 
Top issue 1,190 1.46 100.00 1,428 1.54 100.00 
Totals (1691 issues) 81,422 100.00 100.00 92,887 100.00 100.00 
 
This finding links with a broader, and much expanding, literature on policy attention and 
cascades (see Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The next challenge is to explore the 
mechanisms behind why some issues emerge as bandwagons. Seasoned observers of UK 
policy mobilization note that trying to pick the ‘interesting’ issues at the outset is difficult. 
Jordan and Richardson note that ‘...there is almost an iron law that the politics of detail 
have the capacity to arouse unexpected controversy’ (1987, 149). Initial case study work 
supports this caution; suggesting that exogenous factors – ‘size or scope’ of the issue 
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being consulted on – do not seem to account for bandwagons emerging12. Issues that are 
of the same general type (e.g. initial position papers or ‘small’ regulatory amendments) 
seem to generate different mobilisation patterns. This suggests, consistent with Jones and 
Baumgartner (2005), that endogenous factors, such as the way policy actors monitor and 
cue-take, are likely factors in decisions to mobilise on a given policy issue. However, 
more work is needed; and this will be one area of future work. 
 
(C) The ‘group system’ under devolution? 
The literature on Scottish politics has developed largely bereft of any systematic mapping 
of organised interests. Seasoned observers have speculated, with good cause, that the 
richer institutional context offered by devolution (with its parliament and bolstered civil 
service) would generate more Scottish groups (see Lynch 2001). The survey of groups 
active in post-devolution consultations has allowed us, for the first time, to test this 
prediction. Of our sample of 469 groups (32% response rate), only 17.5% are 10 years 
old or less: which means more than 80% were formed before devolution in 1999. There 
seems to be little support for the suggestion that devolution led to outright ‘interest 
group system’ growth. This finding fits arguments that suggest existing groups have 
enhanced the capacity of their Scottish offshoots (see Cairney, Halpin and Jordan 2009).  
 
There is also a presumption that the Scottish Parliament will act as a magnet for 
organised interests. But, our survey, which asked groups to indicate the frequency with 
which they had engaged in policy-influencing strategies over the preceding 12 months, 
showed that (only ‘very often’ or ‘fairly often’ reported) participating in public 
consultations (76.7%), responding to requests for comments (68.8%), and making 
contact with civil servants (65.9%) are the most popular strategies. Contacting 
parliamentarians or ministers was adopted by 43%, while only 27% said that they 
engaged with parliamentary committees. This does lend considerable weight to the 
argument that consultation – with the bureaucracy – is the usual form of policy making 
(Richardson and Jordan 1979).  
 
Activities 
 
Academic Conferences/Meetings 
Within the confines of the project budget, we have been very active in engaging the 
scholarly community over our project by attending several academic conferences and 
meetings (see Outputs section below). 
 
User-Engagement 
From the initial project design and application, we have maintained contact with key 
stakeholders. We have had several meetings with the Participation Unit at the Scottish 
Government to report progress. Additional meetings were held with various groups 
within the Executive and Parliament; including meetings with the Scottish Government 
Library and Web Team (October 2008) to discuss information management and 
communication issues throughout the consultation process, and meetings with staff at 
the Scottish Parliament Information Centre (June 2008), to discuss, and collect data on, 
                                                 
12 For instance, invitations to respond do not seem to explain actual responses. On a sample of 173 
consultations, we noted that 76% of those that did respond to a consultation were invited to do so. But 
24% of those responding were not invited to do so. The analysis also establishes that the overwhelming 
majority – we have yet to calculate the precise figure – of those invited to respond in fact do not respond. Of 
course, more recently, consultations are available on the web (and one can register to receive invitations 
routinely via email) which means there are very few impediments to ‘access’ to consultation processes. 
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responses to Members’ Bills public consultation exercises. Meetings were held with key 
interested parties outside of government. These included COSLA, SCVO (both February 
2009). Plans are currently underway for us to give a workshop to policy officers of 
SCVO members (June 2009). 
 
Outputs 
 
(a)Publications 
In relation to scholarly publications we have been productive given the short period of 
time we have had a final dataset to work with.  
 
Conference papers 
The following conference papers were delivered during the project: 
 Halpin, D. (2007) ‘Counting policy active organisations in Scotland: Definitions, 
coding and comparison’, paper presented to the ESRC Research Seminar Series 
‘Interest Groups and Democratic Governance’, convened by Prof William 
Maloney, held at University of Aberdeen, 2-3 June 2007. 
 Halpin, D. and Baxter, G. (2008) ' Searching for ‘Tartan’ Policy Bandwagons: 
Mapping the Mobilization of Organized Interests in Public Policy', Prepared for 
delivery at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Boston M.A., August 28-31, 2008. 
 Halpin, D. Thomas, H. and Baxter, G. (2009) ‘Hunting Haggis? In search of the 
“Hollow Core” in Scottish public policy’, Prepared for delivery at the Annual 
Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, January, 
2009. 
 
The following papers are being prepared for delivery at meetings/conferences during 
2009: 
 Halpin, D. and Binderkrantz, A. “Linking Interest Group Characteristics with 
Patterns of Political Engagement: Evidence from Scottish Public Policy” 
prepared for Workshop on “Current Issues in Interest Group Research”, 
Convened by Dr Anne Binderkrantz, held at Aarhus University, Denmark, May 
12th 2009.  
 Halpin, D.  ‘Mapping Public Policy Consultation: Who mobilised over what in 
Scotland?’, Prepared for the 'British Politics Group' roundtable entitled "Pressure 
Groups and the Policy Process" at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Toronto, August, 2009. 
 Halpin, D. and Binderkrantz, A. ‘Towards Explaining Policy Specialization: 
Evidence From Scottish Public Policy’ prepared for delivery at the European 
Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, University of Potsdam, 
September 2009. 
 Baxter, G. (2009). ‘The Best Laid Schemes: the Provision and Accessibility of 
Government Consultation Information in the UK’, prepared for the 2nd 
‘Information: Interactions and Impact’ Conference, Aberdeen, June 2009. 
 
The funding proposal indicated that several journal papers and a book would be 
produced. At this stage, the publishing plan is as follows: 
 The SPSA paper on policy specialisation to be submitted to British Journal of 
Political Science or Journal of European Public Policy [summer 2009]. 
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 A revised version of the 2008 APSA paper focussing on Policy Bandwagons to 
be submitted to West European Politics or Journal of Politics [summer 2009].  
 A revised version of the 2009 APSA paper reporting an overview of mapping 
findings, and comparing to US ‘bias’ findings, to be submitted to British Politics or 
Political Studies [summer 2009]. 
 A book proposal tentatively titled ‘Interest Mobilization and Public Policy: 
Mapping the “British” Policy Style’ is with publishers, with the intention to have 
a final manuscript completed by the middle of 2010.  
 
Newspaper article(s) 
A feature article was published in a Scottish broadsheet newspaper reviewing the projects 
initial findings: Gordon, B. ‘Who shouts the loudest?’, Glasgow Herald , Tuesday 21, Oct 
2008. The Glasgow Herald is keen to run further stories as the analysis progresses. Media 
releases have been circulated at the start and end of data collection. 
 
(b)Project Reports 
To date, the project has generated one project report, which summarised the results of 
the Interest Group Survey. This report was printed and disseminated to all participants in 
our survey.  It was also posted on our project website.  
 
(c)Web-site 
As outlined in the proposal, we constructed a project web site 
[www.organisedinterests.co.uk/darrenhalpin/mobilisation]. The site has posted up all 
outputs listed above and below. It has now been linked to other sites, such as the 
SCVO’s research site. 
 
(d)Datasets  
The two datasets elaborated above are the primary outputs of the project. We are 
currently in discussions with the ESRC data archive at Essex University with respect to 
lodgement. As the project develops we will post amended, or enhanced, datasets via the 
project web-site. 
 
Impacts 
 
As discussed above, the primary purpose of this research project was to generate a 
dataset that in turn would enable the injection of a UK voice in scholarly debates that 
have largely been the preserve of US researchers (using US Congressional data). Needless 
to say, fostering such a voice is not a short term task. As such, the impact of this work is 
best judged in the medium term. The impact of this project depends on: 
1. having US scholars become familiar with the data: this is happening via 
attendance at US conferences, meetings with key researchers in the field – such 
as Prof. Frank Baumgartner, and having the data available for use by selected US 
graduate students,  
2. developing the means for comparative analysis: which is facilitated by coding 
UK data in ways that make it easy to compare with the findings of influential US 
studies (such as Baumgartner and Jones’s Policy Agendas Coding, and Prof. 
Scholzman’s study of Washington Representatives). We have utilised the project’s 
international advisory board to disseminate interest in the data (and the broader 
approach of which it is a pilot). I am working on analysing the group survey 
dataset with a Danish colleague (Dr Anne Binderktrantz) who has similar data for 
Denmark: the intention is to do some comparative analysis in the future. 
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3. authoring and publishing our own articles and a monograph that utilise 
the data to intervene in key debates: see Outputs.  
 
The impact on the Scottish context is significant. We have provided a data table to a 
Masters student at Glasgow University. A request was made by Prof. Paterson 
(Edinburgh) for copies of outputs and he has quoted these in a forthcoming book 
chapter (Paterson 2009). Non-academic users have been interested in the results. The 
Citizen Participation Unit at the Scottish Government and the Scottish Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) have also asked for a copy of the results. The latter 
have also requested that they link from their research portal to our results. The results of 
this project have been picked up by the general media in Scotland. Our survey of Scottish 
interest groups asked for expressions of interest to be involved in future interviews we 
will be conducting – almost 50% indicated interest in future cooperation.  
 
Future Research Priorities 
 
As this project has evolved, some very productive avenues for future research have 
recommended themselves. Given the design of the study, it is clear how additional work 
could be integrated into the existing dataset. We outline these below: 
A. The objective of this work was to pilot an approach to data collection on 
consultations. The logical development is to collect similar data at the UK level. 
To this end we have already applied to the British Academy for funding (the result 
of our application is in June 2009).  
B. It is clear that there are different types of consultations. Some are related to Bills, 
others to EU Directives and still more are simply looking for ideas to flesh out 
early or emerging policy agendas. But, the project did not provide sufficient 
resources to investigate individual consultations in detail. We have dipped into 
several cases to illustrate this variation, but a more in-depth treatment is 
important. We have collected a representative sample of 173 issues across the 25-
year period and we would like to collect a full case analysis of each one.  
C. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) discuss the ways in which ‘cascades’ of policy 
attention (or policy bandwagons) emerge. We have started to explore the micro-
processes of policy mobilisation by developing media data on all consultations in 
2006, but more work is needed. This involves undertaking some interviews with 
policy participants and civil servants to explore mobilisation processes. 
D. The broader issue that has been left untouched by this project is the overall 
significance of consultations for the British policy process. Interviews with policy 
staff and organised interests are necessary to explore case study issues, and to see 
the role of consultations in the evolution of the policy issue. We have been able 
to pursue some of this on our own account. However, given the scale of the task, 
this would be part of a subsequent project proposal. 
E. Further research is required into the information needs and information-seeking 
behaviour of potential and actual consultation respondents, and the extent to 
which the accessibility and communication of consultation information impacts 
upon the participative process. This will also form the basis of a future research 
proposal. 
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